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NOTES AND COMMENTS
COMMON LAW REMEDIES FOR SALT POLLUTION
INTRODUCTION
Salt is a problem which has become disquieting and, in some areas,
alarming for the irrigation farmer of the Southwestern States. The
saline content of many natural streams in the Southwest has been
steadily rising in recent years, and has become so serious on the
lower Colorado River that it has caused the Government of Mexico
to demand that the problem be ameliorated. As a result the Govern-
ments of the United States and Mexico signed an agreement which
guaranteed that the water of the Colorado which is released to Mex-
ico will have a salinity level only slightly higher than that used by the
American farmers across the border.' Although the catastrophic
situation that existed for a time in the Mexicali Valley has not yet
occurred within the United States, the salt problem is becoming
serious for irrigators in many areas.
There are several reasons for this increase in the salinity of streams
in the Southwest. The most important of these are: (1) Consumptive
use of water, especially near the top of a stream system, leaves less
water in the stream to dilute the salt load. The main type of con-
sumptive use in the Southwest, irrigation, consumes only the fresh
water and leaves its salt load behind, thus concentrating the existing
salt in a smaller volume of water.2 (2) The construction of reservoirs
causes more evaporation, leaving less water in the stream to dilute
the salt.3 (3) Many uses of water add more salt to the water. The
prime example of this process is irrigation agriculture, at least during
the early years of a project before a "salt balance" is achieved. Irriga-
tion not only reduces the amount of water in a stream through
1. Minute 242 of the International Boundary and Water Commission. The Colorado
River Salinity Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-320, 88 Stat. 266 (1974), was passed by Con-
gress to implement this agreement. Among other projects, this legislation authorized the
construction of a desalting plant near Yuma, Arizona. See also International Symposium on
the Salinity of the Colorado River, 15 Nat. Res. J. 1-240 (1975), which extensively discusses
Minute 242 and the problems it purports to solve.
2. Irrigation of Agricultural Lands 1000-1001 (R. Hagan, H. Haise, & T. Edminster eds.
1967); Shelledy, Agricultural Irrigation and Saline Quality of Water, 5 Land & Water L. Rev.
491 (1970).
3. Senate Select Committee on National Water Resources, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., National
Water Resources and Problems 26-27 (Comm. Print 1960).
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consumptive use; an additional amount of salt, present in the soil, is
dissolved by the irrigation water and added to the salt load in the
stream.4 (4) In some areas-the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation District
in Arizona is a notable example-the groundwater is highly saline. A
period of over-irrigation for the purpose of leaching salt out of the
soil causes the groundwater table to rise so close to the surface that it
encroaches on the root zone of the crops. In order to save the pro-
ductivity of their fields, the irrigation farmers in these areas pump
the groundwater into the stream with their return flow in order to
lower the water table.' This saline groundwater can have a dramatic
impact on downstream irrigation unless there is enough water re-
maining in the stream to dilute the groundwater sufficiently to make
it usable.
Although the Federal Government has taken substantial measures
to control other types of pollution, salt pollution has received little
attention except as part of an international problem. Even in the
Colorado River Salinity Control Act, only a few short steps were
taken to solve the problem. Most of the projects authorized by the
Act, other than those provided for in Minute 242, will go to control
natural rather than artificial sources of salt on the Colorado and its
tributaries.
The state governments have likewise been lax in developing and
enforcing salinity standards.6 At least two Western states, Arizona
and Wyoming, do recognize salinity as a problem to be controlled,
but have avoided doing anything that would directly regulate irriga-
tion practices and saline return flows.'
Governmental inaction is understandable to a certain degree be-
cause of the complex political and economic questions involved and
the intricate pattern of water uses that would be affected. No one
wants to tinker with such an important system as the system of
water law in the arid states without a clear idea of what the conse-
quences and ramifications will be. As a result of this governmental
inaction, however, it is still pretty much up to the individual farmer
to protect himself if he is injured by salt pollution.
In this paper, therefore, I intend to explore the common law right
of a downstream water right owner to water of usable quality and his
legal ability to protect that right. In order to suggest some tentative
answers to the salt problem, I have developed several hypothetical
4. Id. See also Bower, Some Physical, Technological, and Economic Characteristics of
Water and Water Resources Systems: Implications for Administration, 3 Nat. Res. J. 215,
219 (1963); Shelledy, supra note 2.
5. Hagan et al., supra note 2.
6. Shelledy, supra note 2.
7. Id.
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situations which I hope will illustrate the various aspects of the prob-
lem and test the legal theories in use by the courts. Next I will
discuss various definitions of pollution, the nature of an appropri-
ator's right to water, the legal causes of action available to him to
protect that right, and the remedies that the courts may grant him.
Finally, I will go back to the hypotheticals to see what results the
private litigant can expect from his day in court.
Although I approach the hypotheticals from the point of view of a
New Mexican water user and assume that New Mexico procedural
law will apply, this discussion will of necessity draw on the law of
other appropriation states and will hopefully be relevant to the West-
ern states in general. I have intentionally avoided adding an interstate
dimension to either the hypotheticals or the discussion. Consideration
of choice of forum and conflict of laws problems would complicate
the article without making any significant contribution to the basic
discussion. I have also avoided discussing ground-water problems, for
similar reasons.
HYPOTHETICALS
Hypo 1: A has the oldest right on the river (1890) and he is also
the furthest downstream water user. Fifteen years ago a new irriga-
tion project (I) began operating about ten miles above A's point of
diversion with a priority of 1958. Since much of the soil in this
project was naturally saline, the farmers in the project overirrigated
in order to leach their fields. As a result the water table was raised to
such an extent that saline groundwater began encroaching on the
root zone of the crops. In 1972 the project began pumping the
groundwater in order to lower the water table again. The saline dis-
charge was allowed to flow into the river, drastically increasing its
saline content. A still receives as much water as he has a right to
divert, but the water now kills his crops. A brings suit against I,
which is a corporate entity and owns the water rights used in the
project, to enjoin the discharge of salt water into the river and for
damages. What are his chances of success?
Hypo I A: The facts are the same as in Hypo I except that A has a
priority date of 1965. Does it make any difference that A's right is
junior to I's?
Hypo 1B: The facts are the same as in Hypo 1 except that A has a
priority date of 1973. He now finds that he cannot use the water for
irrigation as he had intended. Does he have any chance of success if
he sues I?
Hypo 1C: The facts are the same as in Hypo 1 except that the
water which A receives is not completely unusable. He is told that if
April 19751]
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he uses twice the normal amount of water to irrigate his lands, the
resultant salt equilibrium will be tolerable for his crops. Since there is
no more unappropriated water in the river, A obtains a permit to
stack his existing entitlement on half of his land. He also files suit
against I for damages and injunctive relief. Will the fact that his right
is impaired rather than destroyed have any effect on the outcome of
the suit?
Hypo 2: B has the oldest water right on the river (1890) and he is
also the furthest downstream user. Five years ago a new irrigation
project (J) began operations with a priority date of 1968. Due to the
consumptive use of water by the crops and the saline nature of the
soil, J's return flow has increased the salinity of the river water at B's
point of diversion to a level that is completely unusable for irriga-
tion. B goes to court against J for injunctive relief and damages.
Hypo 2A: The facts are the same as in Hypo 2 except that B has a
priority date of 1970. Will the fact that B has a junior priority have
any effect on the outcome of the suit?
Hypo 2B: The facts are the same as Hypo 2 except that B is still
able to use the water for irrigating his crops so long as he stacks the
water on only half of his land (the State Engineer has approved his
application to do this). Will this situation constitute sufficient im-
pairment of B's right for him to be successful in court?
Hypo 3: C has the oldest water right on the river (1890) and he is
also the furthest downstream water user. Over the years agricultural
development upstream of C has caused a gradual increase in the
salinity of the river at C's point of diversion. In 1960 C obtained a
permit to stack water from half of his acreage on the other half in
order to continue raising some crops. In 1965 C obtained a twenty
year loan and mortgaged some of his land in order to install tile
drainage to alleviate the salt problem. He still has another eleven
years to pay on the loan. In 1973 the situation became so bad that C
can no longer raise any crops On his land. C files a class action suit,
pursuant to Rule 23(a)(3) of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, against all upstream water users asking for injunctive relief and
damages! Assuming that this suit will be allowed under Rule 23,
will C be successful?
Hypo 3A: Would C be successful if he had brought this suit in
8. It should be noted that the reason that a class action suit was used even though it
would probably not be allowed under the New Mexico version of the rules is to keep the
initial cost of the suit within the realm of possibility for an individual litigant to pay. The
suit could have been brought by suing and serving all of the parties individually. In the end,
of course, the suit would be prohibitively expensive because of the burden of proof as to all
of the defendants.
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1960 before he made any substantial expenditures and before his
right became completely worthless for irrigation?
Hypo 3B: Would C be successful if he had a priority date of 1970
and began constructing his diversionary works at a time when the
water was already so saline that it was practically unusable?
POLLUTION
The first step in developing a legal cause of action to protect
private water users against pollution is to define pollution. In the
apparent absence of a definition by the New Mexico courts, I will
have to look elsewhere. Kinney defined pollution as:
... any use of a stream, or other body of water, that materially fouls
the water, or the deposit therein of any filth or debris that so far
affects the water as to impair its value for ordinary purposes, or
anything which renders the water offensive to taste or smell, or
which is calculated to excite disgust in those using it for ordinary
purposes. 9
This definition has in common with other traditional legal and non-
legal definitions of pollution the idea that filth, debris, foulness, or
disgust must be associated with a condition before it can be labeled
pollution.' o Definitions such as these do not retain much usefulness
in the area of water law because they fail to take into account such
"clean" pollutants as salt, radioactivity, and heat.
A modem definition of pollution must deal with these clean pol-
lutants and must also recognize that not all substances added to
water are harmful; some additives may even be beneficial.'
Another facet to pollution is revealed by Kinney's definition: pol-
lution is related to impairment of use. Although pollution has re-
cently been defined as "all the activities of man that in any way
degrade the quality of water,"' ' 2 and "the introduction of anything
into water,"' ' these definitions are mainly appropriate in maintain-
ing or enhancing the environmental quality of water. They are
obviously not going to be useful to the private litigant who must
show actual damages or irreparable injury to his land or crops in
9. 2 C. Kinney, Irrigation and Water Rights 2043 (2d ed. 1912).
10. 33 Words and Phrases, Pollute (1971); Webster's New International Dictionary 1756
(3d ed. 1966); Black's Law Dictionary 1320 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
11. In Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 45 Wash.2d 616, 277 P.2d 352 (1954), the Washington
Supreme Court held that fluoridation of a city water supply was not pollution because the
amount of fluoride to be added would not contaminate the water.
12. Senate Select Committee, supra note 3, at 25; Comment, Water Pollution Control in
Colorado, 36 U. Colo. L. Rev. 413-414 (1963-64).
13. Matthew, Practical Comment: A Lawyer's Pollution Primer, 16 S.D.L. Rev. 309
(1971).
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order to obtain satisfaction in the courts. A second and more useful
definition is also suggested by Matthew: "Water pollution is the in-
troduction of anything into water which adversely affects a subse-
quent beneficial use." ' 4 Matthew states that this definition has been
tested in the courts, but he does not cite any cases.
Matthew's definition is still lacking in two respects. First, it re-
quires that the pollutant be introduced into the water. It fails to take
into account the situation where a substantial amount of water is
withdrawn from the stream, thereby diminishing the amount of
water available to dilute the salt load of the stream.' " It is also
questionable whether it would cover the situation where a farmer's
irrigation return flow leaches the soil as it returns to the stream.
Second, it fails to set a standard for how great the adverse effect
must be before the water can be considered polluted.
Although there are no New Mexico authorities defining pollution,
there are two New Mexico cases which can be used to remedy, at
least partially, the first of the defects in Matthew's definition. In
Heine v. Reynolds,"6 the New Mexico Supreme Court was consider-
ing the State Engineer's authority to approve changes in well sites.
The Court held that under New Mexico Statutes Annotated,
§ 75-11-7 (1953), the State Engineer had an affirmative duty to
determine whether existing water rights would be impaired before
approving a change in the location of a well or other change in the
use of water.
Appellant argues that, on the basis of reasonableness, the word
"substantially" must be construed to be inherent in the ... statute.
Otherwise, he argues, any impairment, even one de minimus, would
be sufficient to sustain a denial of a change of location. The statute,
of course, does not discuss de minimus impairments; it merely pro-
vides that the applicant must show that the change "will not impair
existing rights." . . . It appears that the state engineer has no author-
ity, under the statute, to grant such a change if there is impairment
to existing rights.' 7
In this case the impairment involved was salt encroachment which
would have increased the salinity of the water in existing wells. In a
later case, City of Roswell v. Berry, ' 8 the Court may have revised its
position. In that case the Court held that where the change of loca-
tion has a "negligible effect" on an existing use, there is no impair-
14. Id. See also Clark, Water Pollution Law in Idaho, 1 Idaho L. Rev. 111 (1964).
15. B. Gindler, 3 Waters and Water Rights § 203.1(C) (R. Clark ed. 1967).
16. 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708 (1962).
17. Id. at 399, 367 P.2d at 709.
18. 80 N.M. 110, 452 P.2d 179 (1969).
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ment of that use. The Court defined negligible effect as "an effect of
such little consequence that it should be disregarded."' 9 The effect
complained of was a slight lowering of the water table with no
accompanying increase in salinity. In City of Roswell v. Reynolds,2 0
the Court refined its position somewhat.
We agree with the City that the lowering of the water table does
not necessarily constitute an impairment of the water rights of ad-
joining appropriators. .. . However, it does not follow that the
lowering of the water table may never in itself constitute an impair-
ment of existing rights. Whether there is impairment depends upon
the facts of each case .... In the present case, we are also concerned
with impairment by reason of increase in the salinity of the water by
reason of a lowering of the water table. 2 1
It seems clear that in New Mexico, then, an impairment to an exist-
ing right is a detrimental change in the availability or condition of
the water which the owner of that right has a right to appropriate.
What is significant about these cases, even though they deal with
ground water, is that the New Mexico Supreme Court does regard salt
as a serious problem for irrigators and would probably define pollu-
tion in a way that would include salt. In the absence of a statute, it is
not clear just what the extent of the impairment of an existing right
must be before the owner of that right has a chance of winning in the
courts. Several other statutes and cases deal with approval of applica-
tions for a water right or a change in use, but none of them give any
direct help. New Mexico Statutes Annotated, § § 75-5-22 and
75-5-23 (1953) provide that changes in the place of use, purpose, and
point of diversion of surface water in water courses should not be
approved by the State Engineer if they will cause any detriment to
existing uses. These statutes do not cover a change in return flows
which is the chief cause of salt pollution from agricultural sources.
Also, in approving applications for new appropriations the state engi-
neer is directed to look at whether there is unappropriated water
available and whether the new use would be contrary to the public
interest.2 2
In City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds,"3 the city applied for per-
mits to appropriate water from the Rio Grande underground water
basin. The State Engineer denied the permits on the ground that the
water which the city proposed to appropriate was necessary to main-
19. Id. at 116, 452 P.2d at 185.
20. 86 N.M. 249, 522 P.2d 796 (1974).
21. Id. at 253, 522 P.2d at 800.
22. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-6 (repl. 1968).
23. 71 N.M. 428, 379 P.2d 73 (1962).
April 19751]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
tain the surface flow of the Rio Grande and that any diminution of
the surface flow would impair the diversion rights of downstream
users. The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the position of the
State Engineer. In doing so it used language which might have the
effect of making Heine, Berry and City of Roswell v. Reynolds di-
rectly applicable to the question of impairment of rights to surface
flows:
There does not exist one body of substantive law relating to appro-
priation of stream water and another body of law relating to appro-
priation of underground water. The legislature has provided some-
what different administrative procedure whereby appropriators'
rights may be secured from the two sources but the substantive
rights, when obtained, are identical.2 4
Although these statutes and cases fail to define pollution, they do
indicate a policy of the courts and legislature in New Mexico that
existing water rights should be protected to the greatest extent pos-
sible consistent with the general welfare. They also show, as men-
tioned above, that salt is considered to be a significant problem in
New Mexico and that any discussion of pollution will be related to
its impact on existing beneficial uses of water. Further, they show
that New Mexico water law clearly recognizes that human activity,
other than the introduction of pollutants, can have a legally cogni-
zable effect on water quality.
Water pollution, for the purposes of a private cause of action in
New Mexico, can be defined as any human activity which has the
effect of changing the nature or quality of public water in such a way
as to impair an existing downstream beneficial use. Although this
definition is somewhat extreme, it does seem to be in accord with
New Mexico law. It must also be recognized that the definition is
quite flexible. Either the courts or the legislature would have to
quantify the word "impair," since the holdings in Heine, Berry, and
City of Roswell v. Reynolds were based on a statute which may not
be specifically applicable to surface water. The specific content given
to this term would depend on a balancing of society's need to de-
velop its water resources to the fullest extent and the desirability of
protecting New Mexico water users in the full and unrestricted use of
their property. 5
24. Id. at 437, 379 P.2d at 79.
25. I referred to Matthew's failure to include a standard for determining actionable
impairment of an existing use as a defect. This is apparently unfair to Matthew since I failed
to quantify actionable impairment in my own definition. I still think that actionable impair-
ment must be quantified, but I do not feel that I have the requisite knowledge and experi-
ence, let alone wisdom, to attempt to do so.
[Vol. 15
REMEDIES FOR SALT POLLUTION
AN APPROPRIATOR'S RIGHT TO PURE WATER
Traditional statements of appropriator's right to pure water are
fairly represented by Wiel, quoting in part from Conrad v. Arrow-
head Hot Springs Hotel Co.:
.. The prior appropriator has an exclusive right to the purity of the
stream as he found it, and cannot in any degree be subordinated to
later claimants on the ground that such subordination is necessary to
allow use by the subsequent appropriator.
2 6
"Locators and appropriators of the waters of a stream have no rights
antecedent to the date of their location. If others have, prior to their
location, decreased the quantity of water flowing in such streams, or
caused a deterioration of its quality, the subsequent locator cannot
complain. . . . In such cases the appropriator takes the water with his
eyes open,-takes it as he finds it ....,27
It is obvious that these are not the principles that the courts apply to
pollution cases even though this may be the language that they use.
Wiel recognizes this because he almost immediately qualifies his prior
statement by acknowledging that there must be a material impair-
ment of the water right of the prior appropriator before he has a
legal cause of action and that the burden of proof is on the senior to
show that his right has been materially impaired.2  In Wright v.
Best,2  also, the court immediately qualified its first statement that
a prior appropriator "is entitled to have the water at his point of
diversion preserved in its natural state of purity," by recognizing that
there must be such corruption of the water "as to essentially impair
its usefulness for the purposes to which he originally devoted it,"
before the appropriator can enforce his right in the courts.' 0
Also, the statement that the junior appropriator must take the
water as he finds it is an overstatement of the law in one respect and
an incomplete statement in another. There are three basic situations
which can exist between an upstream senior and a downstream junior
on a stream where there is unappropriated water. First, from the
time he initiated his use, the senior may be polluting the stream to
such an extent that it is unusable for anyone downstream. Second,
the senior may be causing the water in the stream to be less desirable
although still usable through his use of the water which he is entitled
26. 1 S. Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States 561 (3d ed. 1911). See also Wright v.
Best, 19 Cal.2d 368, 121 P.2d 702, 709 (1942).
27. 1 Wiel, supra note 26, at 567, quoting from Conrad v. Arrowhead Hot Springs Hotel
Co., 103 Cal. 399, 37 P. 386 (1894).
28. 1 Wiel, supra note 26, at 569; see also Ravndal v. Northfork Placers.
29. 19 Cal.2d 368, 121 P.2d 702 (1942).
30. 121 P.2d at 709.
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to divert. Third, the senior may begin polluting the stream after the
rights of the downstream junior have been established. The court's
formulation of the rights of a junior in Conrad v. Arrowhead Hot
Springs Hotel Co. 3' does not seem to cover the third situation at all
and there is serious doubt whether it should control the first.
In the first situation, where a senior appropriator is rendering a
stream entirely unfit for any further use, Suffolk Gold Mining and
Milling Co. v. San Miguel Consol. Mining and Milling Co.32 and
Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines3 ' appear to provide the better rule. The
courts in those cases applied a variation of the riparian reasonable use
doctrine combined with appropriation principles to hold that where
the senior diverts only a part of the stream, the amount of his diver-
sion is the limit of his right to use water and he must allow the
remainder of the water to flow down the stream in such a condition
that it is fit for use further down. Although neither of these cases
have been cited in recent years, they have never been overruled or
even questioned. Also, they seem to be based on sound legal and
public policy principles. In the appropriation states, water is a public
resource which may only be diverted and put to private use in ac-
cordance with law. Senior appropriators are entitled to divert their
entire needs before junior appropriators are entitled to divert any
water. However, senior appropriators are limited in the amount that
they can divert by the amount that they have historically been able
to put to beneficial use; they are not allowed to waste water and
they are not allowed to increase their diversion unless they comply
with the legal requirements for making a new diversion. It would be
inconsistent, then, to prohibit seniors from wasting water or unilater-
ally increasing their diversions while at the same time saying that it is
all right for them to so foul the streams that the water is useless to
anyone else. In an area where water is essential to life, such an
uneconomical use should not be tolerated.3" A more accurate state-
ment of the law would seem to be that a senior may divert water and
put it to beneficial use in compliance with law. If the use to which
the senior puts the water causes a deterioration in the quality of the
stream which is not unreasonable and which does not destroy the
usability of the water, a subsequent downstream appropriator cannot
complain-he must take the water as he finds it. For instance, main-
taining a "salt balance" in an existing irrigation project would not, in
31. 103 Cal. 399, 37 P. 386 (1894).
32. 9 Colo. App. 407,48 P. 828 (1897).
33. 93 Colo. 319, 44 P.2d 1024 (1934).
34. See 1 Wiel, supra note 26, at 567-68, 570; 2 Kinney, supra note 8, at 2069; State v.
California Packing Corp., 105 Utah 182, 141 P.2d 386 (1943).
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most cases, cause an unreasonable deterioration in the quality of a
stream. If, on the other hand, the senior causes the entire stream to
become unusable through his pollution, he is in effect wasting water
which is owned by the public. Anyone who can put that water to
beneficial use would seem to be a proper party to complain of the
unreasonable pollution." Public policy and the law of waste would
seem to support curtailing the pollution of a stream by a senior
appropriator. For instance, in State v. McLean3 6 the New Mexico
Supreme Court, in a case of forfeiture for waste of water from an
uncapped artesian well, held:
Water appropriators and appropriations on each of the artesian
basins of the state are numerous. The State is vitally concerned in
every appropriation. The need for water is imperative, and often the
supply is insufficient....
When a land owner exceeds this (beneficial) use, he is appropri-
ating to himself that which belongs to others who are entitled to a
like use, and to that extent is obstructing the necessary use of water
so as to interfere with its beneficial use, and which, by § 75-12-8,
1953 Compilation, is declared to be a public nuiscance. Whatever
right one has, even in his own, is subject to that established principle
that his use shall not be injurious to the rights of others, or of the
general public.
3 7
In the other situation mentioned above where the senior upstream
appropriator suddenly begins to unreasonably pollute a stream, the
same principle would seem to apply.3 8 The senior would not be
allowed to suddenly increase his diversion, begin consuming his re-
35. Whether such a party would have standing is a problem I do not intend to deal with
here. If such a party were denied standing, no one would be able to protect the public
interest in the stream except the state. Traditional standing rules would seem to deny a
prospective user the standing to bring such a suit unless he could show actual injury. Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 US 727 (1972). The dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun, however,
indicates that standing rules may be changed in the foreseeable future. Also, the court may
find that the would-be appropriator has been injured in some other way, such as in the
enjoyment of his land, so that he would have standing. See also National Helium Corp. v.
Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).
36. 62 N.M. 264, 272-73, 308 P.2d 983 (1957).
37. Id. at 272-73, 308 P.2d at 988-89. See also Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy
District v. Peters, 50 N.M. 165, 173 P.2d 490 (1946); Gindler, supra note 15, § § 210.4(H)
and 212.3(A) where it is stated that a use by a prior appropriator, within the limits of his
preference, is per se reasonable and that a subsequent appropriator may not complain of the
pollution. It is then suggested that a use of water by a prior appropriator, especially a minor
use, which renders the entire stream unusable, may not constitute a valid appropriative right
because it is unreasonable and wasteful.
38. In Gindler, supra note 15, § 212.2(B), it is also suggested that a prior appropriator
may lose his preference as to the quality of water he receives and the type of pollution he
can reasonably cause if he changes his use after the initiation of rights by other appropria-
tors.
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turn flow, or even make any change in his use or point of diversion
which would cause any detriment to downstream users, regardless of
priority.3 It is inconceivable, then, that a senior should be allowed
to do by pollution what he could not do by changing his use or point
of diversion.
The Colorado Supreme Court has put the entire matter of a down-
stream appropriator's right against an upstream pollutor on a sound
basis in Farmers Irrigation Company v. Game and Fish Commis-
sion." and Game and Fish Commission v. Farmers Irrigation Com-
pany.' ' In the former case the court stated:
A priority to the use of water for irrigation or domestic purposes is a
property right and as such is fully protected by the constitutional
guaranties relating to property in general. 4 2
On this basis the court held that the plaintiffs had stated a legal cause
of action where they had alleged that the water:
... was so polluted as to render it unfit for the purposes to which it
had theretofore been applied by plaintiffs, and that their property
rights therein were destroyed or seriously damaged.4 3
The second case reaffirmed this holding and added the language:
Article II, Section 15, of the Colorado Constitution provides in per-
tinent part that, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged,
for public or private use, without just compensation." This provision
is not limited in its application to condemnation proceedings. It
prohibits not only the taking of property but also the damaging
thereof, and whosoever damages the property of another, whether
39. Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d
629, 631-32 (1954), where the court said: ".... junior appropriators have vested rights in
the continuation of stream conditions as they existed at the time of their respective appro-
priations, and that subsequent to such appropriations they may successfully resist all pro-
posed changes in points of diversion and use of water from that source which in any way
materially injures or adversely affects their rights." See also Hill v. Standard Mining Co., 12
Idaho 223, 85 P. 907, 910 (1906); "Where the lower appropriator makes his appropriation
he has the right to assume the upper appropriator will continue the use of the water as he
found it, and if any change would damage him in the use of his appropriation, the courts
will protect him in his rights." But see Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal District No. 1
v. Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co., 179 Colo. 36, 499 P.2d 1190 (1972), where the
court held that a water right owner had no vested right in the point of return flow of the
effluent of a sewage plant. This appears to be a very narrow holding. See Williams, Opti-
mizing Water Use: The Return Flow Issue, 44 U. Colo. L. Rev. 301 (1972-73) for a
discussion.
40. 149 Colo. 318, 369 P.2d 557 (1962).
41. 162 Colo. 301, 426 P.2d 562 (1967).
42. 369 P.2d at 559-60.
43. Id. at 560.
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he be an individual or an agency of the state, must be held respon-
sible in damages for the loss caused thereby. 44
Although a state agency was the polluter in these cases and in spite
of the specific language in the Colorado Constitution with regard to
"public or private use," this analysis is much more precise than the
earlier statements and would seem to be valid in any appropriation
state where property rights in the use of water are legally protected.
In a similar but less well articulated case, Bunker Hill & Sullivan
Mining & Concentrating Co. v. Polak,' I a federal circuit court of
appeals considered an Idaho constitutional provision which gave pre-
ference to mining and milling uses of water over industrial and agri-
cultural uses. The mining company claimed that this implied a right
to pollute the stream they took their water from to any degree they
found expedient. The court rejected this argument on the ground
that Idaho law only gave the miners a preference in the use of water
and did not give them the right to cause unreasonable pollution.
We find no merit in the contention and no authority to sustain it.
It asserts for the miner in Idaho constitutional rights unknown to
American constitutional law-the right not only to a preference in
the use of a stream, but the right to inflict unlimited injury upon
property of those who have acquired vested rights as manufacturers
or agriculturists. 4 6
The implication of this case seems to be that one water user may
have a legal preference over another as to the use of available water,
but that it is illegal and perhaps unconstitutional for even a preferred
water user to injure or destroy the existing property rights of others.
The general principle upon which an appropriator should be able
to depend, therefore, is that once he has established a right to ap-
propriate water for a particular purpose, he has a property right that
is legally protectable.4 7 If anyone unreasonably injures or destroys
that right by polluting the stream from which the appropriator
diverts his water, he has the right to either damages or injunctive
relief or both against the polluter. This principle recognizes that: (1)
an appropriator must take the water as he finds it unless the up-
stream polluter is maintaining a public nuisance; (2) water quality
can deteriorate considerably before there is a legal cause of action
available; (3) it is the usability of the water that is protected; (4)
44. 426 P.2d at 565 (emphasis added by the court).
45. 7 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 581 (1925).
46. 7 F.2d at 585.
47. Snow v. Abalos, 18 N.M. 681, 140 P.2d 1044 (1914); New Mexico Products Co. v.
New Mexico Power Co., 42 N.M. 311, 77 P.2d 634 (1937).
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anyone who causes the water to become unusable, whether junior or
senior, is liable to an existing downstream user who is injured, and
(5) it is inevitable that the quality of a stream will become progres-
sively worse downstream from its source.4 "
CAUSES OF ACTION
An appropriator whose water right has been impaired by pollution
has four possible theories of recovery: trespass, negligence, strict
liability, and nuisance.4 9 Trespass is not a proper theory for the
ordinary pollution case because a direct invasion of the plaintiff's
property must have taken place." 0 In order for trespass to be proper,
the defendant probably must have released the salt water at a point
where it would flow directly on the plaintiff's land.
Strict liability is also limited in use. This theory would have to be
based on a statutory definition of pollution which gives the plaintiff
an express or implied cause of action.' I There does not seem to be
any New Mexico statute which could be stretched to cover salt pollu-
tion in a natural watercourse.
Negligence would seem to be of more general value and would not
depend so much on a theory of pollution. Any negligent act which
illegally invades a legally protectable interest of another is actionable.
Since a water right is a legally protectable interest, the owner of the
right has a cause of action against a person who damages that right.
However, if the negligence theory is used, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant was negligent in allowing the pollution to escape
into the stream. This is an added element of proof which the plaintiff
does not need to bear if he sues under a nuisance theory and if the
pollution was intentional. Since pollution is intentional if either (1)
the defendant intended to harm the plaintiff or (2) the defendant
knew that pollution was resulting or was substantially certain to
result from what he was doing," 2 the plaintiff would normally have
an easier. burden of proof under the nuisance theory. Indeed, negli-
gence is not considered to be a proper theory at all except where the
pollution was unintentional. 3
48. This is different in formulation and concept from the summary in Gindler, supra
note 14, § 212.3(E), but I think that the practical result is similar. I put more emphasis on
the protection of existing water rights rather than on priority.
49. Clark, supra note 14, at 114-16.
50. Id. at 114; Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining and Concentrating Co. v. Polak, 7 F.2d 583
(9th Cir. 1925); Boise Development Co. Ltd. v. Boise City, 30 Idaho 675, 167 P. 1032
(1917). See also 3 Clark, supra note 14, § 210.3.
51. Gindler, supra note 15, § 217.2.
52. Id., § 210.4(C).
53. Id., § 210.4(I). See also Clark, supra note 14, at 115. This distinction between
negligence and nuisance does not seem to be consistent with the distinction made in Hunts-
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The court in Bunker Hill approved this definition of nuisance:
So it is a nuisance if a riprarian proprietor shall cast into the stream
earth, sand, and refuse of his business, or other things, which by the
flowing water are carried and deposited upon the land of a pro-
prietor below. The tort here consists in the act of committing the
rubbish to the stream; the deposit upon the land below is only the
consequence from which a cause of action in favor of a particular
individual arises.5
4
According to the analysis of the Restatements s contained in
Clark,' 6 the plaintiff in an action for private nuisance must prove
that he suffered substantial harm; that the pollution was intentional;
and that the defendant's actions were unreasonable in the circum-
stances which include any waste of water by the defendant, the
relative priorities of the parties, the use made of the water by the
parties, the relative value of the uses, their positions on the stream,
and whether the pollution can easily be abated. Proof of these ele-
ments would seem to be required in addition to proving that the
defendant caused the pollution in the first place.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that a polluter will not be
liable for nuisance if: (1) he does not cause substantial harm to the
plaintiff, regardless of priority; (2) he is a prior appropriator who has
not significantly changed his use unless his use is minor in relation to
the amount of water he is polluting and thus wasting; or (3) his use
of the water is more valuable than that of the plaintiff, regardless of
priority except that (a) a prior appropriator should abate the pollu-
tion if it is cheap and convenient for him to do so, while (b) a
subsequent appropriator should make substantially more effort to
abate the pollution.
Although I think that this formulation is generally correct, I think
that it is oversimplified and inaccurate in several respects. First, I
think that it may not have been appropriate to look to the Restate-
ment which deals with riparian rights, for principles which are to be
applied to appropriative law. The economic and policy considerations
are not the same. Nor is the basic nature of an appropriative right the
same as a riparian right. Second, this formulation still does not take
into account the fact that a junior appropriator acquires a vested
right in the condition of the stream at the time that he initiates his
man v. Smith, 62 N.M. 457, 463, 312 P.2d 103, 106-7 (1957), but that case involved an
entirely different situation.
54. 7 F.2d at 585.
55. Restatement of Torts, ch. 41, "Invasions of Interests in the Private Use of Waters
('Riparian Rights')," at 313 (1939).
56. Gindler, supra note 15, ch. 13, especially § § 210 and 212.
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right. Third, it places too much emphasis on the determination of the
relative values of the users' purpose in diverting the water. In an
extreme case like Town of Antioch v. Williams Irrigation District,5 7
where the value of the senior use was insignificant in comparison to
the value of the junior use and it would have been relatively easy and
cheap for the senior to alleviate the problem by changing its point of
diversion, such a balancing of economic values may have been ap-
propriate. The holding in Antioch may also have been based on a
theory of waste. The town diverted its water just above the point in
the river where it began to be tainted by sea water. When the irriga-
tion district began operating, the amount of water it diverted caused
the sea water to penetrate further upstream and pollute Antioch's
water supply. Thus, protection of the senior use would have effec-
tively prevented any further development on the river; protection of
an insignificant senior use would have wasted most of the rest of the
volume of the river.' 8 Looked at in this way, it is not unreasonable
to require the senior to move its point of diversion a few miles
upstream, especially since it would have cost Antioch less to do so
than it cost to bring the suit against the irrigation district. Such a
requirement would not seem to be a taking or a destruction of an
existing right either. Finally, I think that Clark's analysis would lead
to many subtle problems and distortions in the application of his
principles to the diverse fact situations which might arise.
The New Mexico Supreme Court defined private nuisance in Jelli-
son v. Gleason' 9 as "a civil wrong based on a disturbance of rights in
land." This same definition would also seem to apply to rights to the
use of water but does not distinguish between the formulation in
Clark and the one that I intend to use which is based more solidly in
protecting existing rights to the use of water. Other New Mexico
cases, particularly Heine v. Reynolds6 0 and State v. McLean,6 1 seem
to indicate that it is also the policy of the New Mexico courts and
legislature to protect existing rights and that a balancing of the rela-
tive economic values of various uses or types of uses is not likely to
occur, with two possible exceptions.6 2 First, there is the possibility
57. 188 Cal. 451, 205 P. 688 (1922).
58. See also Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966), where the court
held that the right of a senior water appropriator in a closed, nonrechargeable underground
basin was not impaired by the granting of further permits to appropriate water in the basin
where the state engineer had rated the life of the basin at forty years pursuant to his
statutory authority and the permits granted would not shorten the life of the basin to less
than forty years.
59. 77 N.M. 445, 448, 423 P.2d 876, 877 (1967).
60. 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708 (1962).
61. 62 N.M. 264, 308 P.2d 983 (1957).
62. Shelledy, supra note 2, at 497.
[Vol. 15
REMEDIES FOR SAL T POLLUTION
that municipalities may be treated more leniently.6 3 Second, where
the effect on an existing use is negligible, the courts might not recog-
nize it as an impairment. 4
Although no private citizen seems to have ever brought a nuisance
action specifically against agriculturally caused salinity, there are a
number of cases in which farmers and stockraisers brought successful
nuisance actions against oil companies for allowing salt water to
pollute streams. 6 1 In a proper case, therefore, a court would have
little trouble in applying general pollution and nuisance principles in
a case of agriculturally caused salinity which unreasonably pollutes a
stream and causes substantial injury to an existing downstream bene-
ficial use of water.
ANSWERS TO THE HYPOTHETICALS
Hypo 1: A will win if he can prove that the water is polluted, the
project intentionally caused the pollution, the pollution has des-
troyed his water right for its accustomed purpose, he was substan-
tially harmed, and his use is not so insignificant in comparison with
the project's that it should be disregarded.
A should have no problem proving that the stream is polluted
under almost any definition of pollution. The project introduced a
pollutant into the stream which, at least in part, was not a byproduct
of its use of the water. In Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concen-
trating Co. v. Polak6 6 and Hill v. Standard Mining Co. 6 7 the courts
made a distinction between dumping waste materials into the water
and pollution which was a byproduct of the defendant's legitimate
use of the water. Using a stream to carry away waste and debris is
pollution when it is not directly related to the beneficial use for
which the water is diverted. Only when the pollution is a byproduct
of the beneficial use will the court look to see if the pollution is
reasonable.
The difficulty of proving that it was the project which caused the
pollution is outside the scope of this discussion. For the purposes of
these hypotheticals I am assuming that A can prove this element of
his case.
It should not be difficult to prove that the project's actions were
intentional since, if the groundwater was so saline that the project
63. See State v. Crider, 78 N.M. 213, 431 P.2d 45 (1967).
64. City of Roswell v. Berry, 80 N.M. 110,452 P.2d 179 (1969).
65. Most of these cases are from Kansas and Oklahoma. See also Love Petroleum Co. v.
Jones, 205 So.2d 274 (Miss. 1967), and Duhon v. Buckley, 161 So.2d 301 (La.App. 1964).
66. 7 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 581 (1925).
67. 12 Idaho 223, 85 P. 907 (1906).
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had to get rid of it, it was virtually certain that it would damage any
irrigators who were diverting water further downstream.
Again, A should have no difficulty in proving that he was substan-
tially injured and that his water right has been destroyed for irriga-
tion purposes.
The project's major argument in this case would undoubtedly be
that A's use is minor or of little value in comparison with the contin-
uing operation of an entire irrigation project. This argument would
have to be based on either a balancing of the equities and conven-
iences or on the doctrine developed in Town of Antioch v. Williams
Irrigation District6 8 which may itself be an unarticulated application
of the balancing doctrine. In balancing the equities and conveniences,
a court of equity denies injunctive relief because not to do so would
visit severe consequences on the defendant while being of slight bene-
fit to the plaintiff.6 9 This doctrine would seem to be inapplicable
here because the resultant benefit to A would not be slight and the
consequences for the project are not that severe. There are other
methods of irrigation which could be economically used which
would not cause the same salt problems for either A or the project.
The Antioch doctrine would not seem to apply here either for
several reasons. Protection of A's use of water would not cause either
a halt in further upstream development or a waste of the available
water in the stream; it is only an unreasonable and wasteful use of
water that is being halted if A wins. It is the project that is rendering
the stream unusable, not A; this is contrary to the situation in An-
tioch where the defendant was making beneficial use of the water
and the protection of the plaintiffs right would have wasted most of
the stream flow. Finally, A does not seem to have any alternative
source of water. If a supplemental well would serve A's purpose as
well as a diversion of stream water, then it might be appropriate to
apply the Antioch doctrine and require A to make an application to
dig such a well.
It still seems wasteful of a public resource, though, to allow the
project to continue polluting the stream. In a case such as this, a
sound water management policy would seem to require that the
project stop its pollution, either by treating or evaporating the drain-
age water or by changing its method of irrigation. After all, it was the
project's lack of foresight and planning that caused the problem; why
should the burden of the loss be shifted to A?
Hypo IA: The outcome of this suit should be the same. Even
68. 188 Cal. 451, 205 P. 688 (1922).
69. Carlsbad Irrigation District v. Ford, 46 N.M. 335, 341, 128 P.2d 1047, 1051 (1942);
Wright v. Best, 19 Cal.2d 368, 121 P.2d 702 (1942).
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though A is junior to the project, A has a vested right in maintaining
the quality of the stream as it was when he initiated his right to use
water. Even a senior may be prohibited from changing his use of the
stream if it would substantially injure a downstream junior.7 o
Hypo 11B: This is a much more difficult situation for A. The first
rule is that a subsequent appropriator must take a stream as he finds
it." A found this stream polluted. A will not win unless he can
convince a court that: (1) the project's practices are wasteful of a
public resource,7 2 (2) the project should forfeit its use or be en-
joined from continuing the waste, and (3) A is a proper party to
bring such a suit. If A is adjudged to be a proper party to sue and if it
is realistic to think that the water would be used further downstream
(instead of drying up or being wasted to Texas or Arizona), then I
think that A would have a reasonable chance of winning, especially
in view of State v. McLean."7
Hypo IC: Here is where the precise meanings of "impairment"
and "substantial harm" become important. A is still receiving his full
entitlement of water, but he is able to make only half the use of it
that he previously could. It is probably beyond argument that A
would be able to "call the river" if he were only getting half of his
quota of water. Since the quantity of water needed for irrigation is
directly linked to its quality,7 4 it would seem logical that A should
have a legal cause of action for any unreasonable change in the
quality of the water which caused an increase in the amount of water
required to irrigate the same acreage. In view of the solicitude the
New Mexico courts and legislature have shown for existing uses, as
evidenced by Heine v. Reynolds7" and New Mexico Statutes Anno-
tated, § § 75-5-22, 75-5-23 and 75-11-7 (1953), it is likely that "im-
pairment" and "substantial harm" would be defined to cover this
situation. It is, of course, difficult to draw the line between a legally
significant impairment and a de minimis impairment, but a 50 per-
cent decrease in economic benefit from the use of water would not
seem to be de minimis.
Hypo 2: The primary difference between this situation and Hypo
70. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 75-5-22 and 75-5-23 (repl. 1968); Farmers Highline Canal &
Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954); Hill v. Standard
Mining Co., 12 Idaho 223, 85 P. 907 (1906).
71. Conrad v. Arrowhead Hot Springs Hotel Co., 103 Cal. 399, 37 P. 386 (1894).
72. Suffolk Gold Mining and Milling Co. v. San Miguel Consol. Mining and Milling Co., 9
Colo. App. 407, 48 P. 828 (1897); Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, 93 Colo. 319, 44 P.2d 1024
(1934).
73. 62 N.M. 264, 308 P.2d 983 (1957).
74. Hagan, supra note 2, at 1000-1001; Bower, supra note 4, at 215.
75. 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708 (1962).
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1 is that here the pollution of the stream is a direct result of J's
legitimate use of the water for irrigation, while in Hypo 1, the proj-
ect was also pumping saline groundwater into the stream. In this
situation, though, J is still polluting the river since his use of the
water has had the effect of making it so saline that it has impaired a
downstream use. As a result the court would undoubtedly render
judgment in favor of B7 6 unless it felt impelled to balance the
equities and conveniencies or apply the Antioch doctrine.'" Whether
or not the court would take this latter course would depend on
whether B's use was insignificant compared to J's and whether B had
an economically viable alternative source of water. The fact that
there are alternative methods of irrigation available to J would tip
the balance the other way. A real possibility in this situation would
be permanent damages which would compensate B for the per-
manent loss of his water right.?8
Hypo 2A: The fact that B has a junior priority will probably be
dispositive of the outcome of the suit since a junior appropriator takes
the water as he finds it. 79 B's only hope would be to argue that J's
use of the stream's water was unreasonable and wasteful. 8 0 Since J is
using normal irrigation practices, however, the court would probably
reject this argument.
Hypo 2B: The outcome of this suit would be the same as the
outcome of Hypo IC so long as the court did not balance the
equities and conveniences or apply the Antioch doctrine in this
hypo; it is more likely that the court would do so here since J's use of
the water is legitimate and reasonable, aside from its polluting effect.
If the court found that B was senior and that J's pollution had
caused an economic loss to B of 50 percent of the productivity of B's
land, it would probably find that B's water right had been legally
impaired and that B had suffered substantial harm. Here again, per-
manent damages to compensate B for the loss of his water right
might be the most appropriate remedy.
Hypo 3: This situation is very similar to Town of Antioch v.
Williams Irrigation District,8 1 where the value of the senior use was
insignificant in comparison to the value of the junior use and it
76. Wright v. Best, 19 Cal.2d 368, 121 P.2d 702 (1942); Farmers Irrigation Company v.
Game and Fish Commission, 149 Colo. 318, 369 P.2d 557 (1962).
77. Town of Antioch v. Williams Irrigation District, 188 Cal. 452, 205 P. 688 (1922).
78. Gindler, supra note 15, § 218.2(C).
79. Conrad v. Arrowhead Hot Springs Hotel Co., 103 Cal. 399, 37 P. 386 (1894).
80. Suffolk Gold Mining and Milling Co. v. San Miguel Consol. Mining and Milling Co., 9
Colo. App. 407, 48 P. 828 (1897); Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, 93 Colo. 319, 44 P.2d 1024
(1934).
81. 188 Cal. 452, 205 P. 688 (1922).
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would have been relatively easy and cheap for the senior to alleviate
the problem by changing its point of diversion. The rationale of this
case would seem to be that a minor use of water, even though it is a
property right, must give way to public welfare. This is also probably
the rationale behind Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal District
No. 1 v. Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co.8 2 In that case a new
sewage plant was needed and the only feasible site was downstream
of the existing plant. The minor private users of water who had
depended on the return flow of the former plant had to give way to
the greater public good.
Even if C could bear the staggering burden of proof against all the
defendants, C would still lose. No court would enjoin all or even a
substantial number of upstream uses to protect one minor down-
stream user. Permanent damages would seem to be a compromise
remedy which would compensate C without placing an undue burden
on the upstream users. It is surprising that the courts did not con-
sider this alternative in the Antioch or Denver case. The fact that C
had made such substantial expenditures would make permanent
damages the most appealing alternative.
Hypo 3A: C would lose for the same reasons he lost in hypo 3.
Permanent damages would be less likely here because his situation is
not so pathetic as in hypo 3.
Hypo 3B: C does not even deserve sympathy in this case. He
knew or should have known the water was unusable. His loss is his
own fault. This is certainly a case for the application of the rule that
the subsequent appropriator must take the water in a stream as he
finds it.
CONCLUSION
A private right owner who uses his water for irrigation and whose
right is damaged or destroyed by salt pollution from irrigation
sources does have legal remedies that he can pursue in the courts
with a reasonable hope of success in certain circumstances. He must
single out one or a few polluters who are causing a significant impair-
ment of his water right. He will only be successful, though, if the
polluters (I) have a junior priority or (2) began their polluting use of
the water after the initiation of the complainant's use. The complain-
ant may also be successful if he can persuade the court that the
polluter's use of the water is wasteful or unreasonable, regardless of
priority or when the pollution began.
If the plaintiff has to join more than a few defendants, either the
82. 179 Colo. 36, 499 P.2d 1190 (1972).
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suit will become prohibitively expensive or he will risk having the
court find that it is not in the public interest to protect his minor use
of water.
An appropriator of water has a right to a certain quantity and
quality of water, depending on stream conditions and prior uses at
the time he initiated his own use. The satisfaction of having a legally
protectable right will not irrigate crops, however, when the need is
urgent, the defendants are myriad, and the burden of proof is stag-
gering.
WILLIAM J. DARLING
